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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
___________ 
 
Nos. 03-4500, 03-4753 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
GEORGE A. WINKELMAN 
 
Appellant at No. 03-4500 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOHN F. WINKELMAN, JR. 
 
Appellant at No. 03-4753 
___________ 
 
On Motion to Recall the Mandate from Appeals  
From the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Nos. 4-01-cr-00304-8 and 4-01-cr-00304-9) 
District Judge:  The Honorable James F. McClure 
___________ 
 
Before: SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, 
and ALARCÓN
*
, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
(Filed:  March 26, 2014) 
 
                                              
*
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, sitting by designation. 
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___________ 
 
OPINION SUR MOTIONS TO RECALL MANDATE 
___________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 Presently before the Court are motions by pro se Appellants George A. 
Winkelman and John F. Winkelman, Jr., to recall our mandate and to reinstate their direct 
appeals so they can try to seek relief under the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Alleyne 
v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).  We asked the Government to file a response to 
these motions, which it has done.   
 The brothers Winkelman have a long and protracted litigation history in this 
Circuit, which we need not relate in detail.  It suffices to say that both of their prior cases 
involved challenges to the constitutionality of their sentences, which they brought as 
prisoners in custody, and which were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  We denied 
certificates of appealability in each case.  See United States v. John F. Winkelman, No. 
08-1931; United States v. George A. Winkelman, No. 08-1932. 
 The Winkelmans’ latest motion—to recall our mandate and reinstate their direct 
appeals—argues that their sentences are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Alleyne that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an 
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  133 
S.Ct. at 2155.  Of course, we have the “inherent power” to recall our mandate, but that 
“power can be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances.”  Calderon v. Thompson, 
523 U.S. 538, 549-50 (1998); American Iron & Steel Institute v. E.P.A., 560 F.2d 589, 
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594 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).  We are also bound by “the 
statutory and jurisprudential limits applicable in habeas corpus cases,”  id. at 553, and we 
determine whether a petition is “second or successive” by looking at “the judgment 
challenged.” Magwood v. Patterson, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 2797 (2010).  Here, the Winkelmans 
challenge the same judgment of conviction and sentence they originally contested in 
2007.  Accordingly, we construe the Winkelmans’ latest motions as seeking relief under 
§ 2255.  Inasmuch as they previously challenged their convictions and sentences in a § 
2255 petition, we have little difficulty finding these latest filings to be successive.  
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), cast the 
federal courts of appeals in the role of “gate-keeper,” charging us with the responsibility 
of “preventing the repeated filing of habeas petitions that attack the prisoner’s underlying 
conviction.”  Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 411 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).  To 
fulfill this gate-keeping role, AEDPA directs us to dismiss any claim presented in a 
second or successive petition that the petitioner presented in a previous application.  28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).   
A successive § 2255 motion is authorized only if it is based on “newly discovered 
evidence,” or on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”  Id.  The Winkelmans 
argue that Alleyne announced a new retroactive rule of constitutional law because it 
overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).  They cite United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), Apprendi v.  
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 466 
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(1998), maintaining that this combination of decisions demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court has made Alleyne retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.  We do not 
agree. 
 The Supreme Court may well have announced a new rule of law in Alleyne.  See, 
e.g.,  Simpson v. United States, 721 F.3d 875, 876 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that Alleyne 
announced a new rule of law).  We make no definitive pronouncement on that question, 
but note that “a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the 
Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.”  Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001).  The 
Alleyne rule was announced in a direct appeal without the Supreme Court expressly 
holding it to be retroactive to cases on collateral review.  See United States v. Redd, 735 
F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2013).  Further, “the clearest instance, of course, in which [the 
Supreme Court] can be said to have ‘made’ a new rule retroactive is where [it has] 
expressly held the new rule to be retroactive in a case of collateral review and applied the 
rule to that case.”  Tyler, 533 U.S. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring).  But, the Supreme 
Court has not so stated in Alleyne.  We note specifically that none of the cases the 
Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings in light of Alleyne involved collateral 
attacks on convictions. 
 Of course, the Supreme Court could make a new rule of law retroactive by putting 
it in a category of cases previously held to be retroactive.  See id. at 668–69 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring).  Those categories are: new substantive rules that place “certain kinds of 
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making 
authority to proscribe”; and new procedural rules that “are implicit in the concept of 
5 
 
ordered liberty.”  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (citations and quotations 
omitted); see also Chaidez v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1107 n. 3 (2013) (continuing 
to recognize only the two Teague exceptions).  The latter is set aside for “watershed rules 
of criminal procedure” which “‘alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements”’ of the adjudicatory process.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 The Alleyne decision does not fit into either category.  We are not alone in this 
determination.  See Redd, 735 F.3d at 91; In re Payne, 733 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 2013);  
Simpson, 721 F.3d at 876.  Therefore, we now hold that Alleyne cannot be applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral review.  The Winkelmans’ latest motions are, 
consequently, denied. 
 It is so ordered. 
 
